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 In the last ten years, international organizations have defined more clearly the 
role and the tasks of humanitarian aid in contemporary international relations. The 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a good illustration of the advantages but also 
of the disadvantages of today’s humanitarian operations. The peacekeeping 
operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the largest operation of this kind that has 
been set in motion by the international community. In its humanitarian aspect it is 
complex and multi-layered. Humanitarian campaigns today are more 
philanthropically- than organizationally-driven, but it is the latter aspect that 
makes them fail or succeed. It is not enough to provide humanitarian aid, but its 
distribution to the recipients who need it must be organized. That process involves 
several essential factors: international and inter-state organizations, governmental 
organizations as well as non-governmental (international and local) organizations 
and associations. The example of Bosnia and Herzegovina shows to what extent 
the mentioned factors contribute to the success of a humanitarian operation, but 
also the problems which stem from their undefined role and tasks. 
 
 Introduction 
 The role of aid interventions within the international relations system was reinstated 
more clearly than in the past by the recent scenarios of war crises, thus becoming a key 
element both in the receiving and the organising countries. 
 In particular, the case of the war in the former Yugoslavia and the subsequent 
Bosnian context stand out because of the proportion of aid poured into the country 
during and after the conflict, thus producing a very complex frame regarding the mo-
bilised resources, the number of actors animating it, the type of interventions initiated, 
the wide institutional levels covered and the Western public opinion involved. 
 Nevertheless, the awareness of the increased problems of aid initiatives in the 
Bosnian case – and of their frequent inability to reach the established goals – was late in 
gaining ground in the communis opinio and in general among the professionals, within 
the international agencies and in the NGOs. 
 Public opinion continued to look at aid more as a 'philantropic' than an 'organizing' 
issue, focusing more on the values inspiring solidarity\emergency and co-opera-
tion\development initiatives, than on its real impact. As for international agencies, they 
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persistently tried to adapt the new scenarios to the intervention models already consoli-
dated elsewhere during other crises, instead of the contrary. 
 This article, even without denying the moral sphere of humanitarian intervention, 
focuses more on the different but complementary aspects that determined its uneffec-
tiveness in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), estimated on the basis of both the technical 
execution and the political effects produced. 
 In order to do this it will be important to underline the characteristics that make BiH 
a peculiar 'scenario' in comparison with the known ones, as well as clarifying, by taking 
into consideration these peculiarities, how the type of 'actors' concerned has changed. 
 Thus emerges a quite negative overall perspective and a critical frame that does not 
mean to generalize, nor to deny the positive aspects of a great number of solidarity ini-
tiatives and co-operation projects in the Balkans, of which the writer had an opportunity 
to ascertain personally. 
 Unfortunately that did not apply to the majority of the interventions in that context. 
 The absolute uniqueness of the Bosnian scenario can be summarised in five points, 
each with an almost strict causality, that unleashed a set of new variables that compli-
cated the work of those who take care of the organisation of the aid interventions, both 
in the humanitarian emergency and the reconstruction-development aspects. 
 
 A nearby country 
 Thanks to its location, BiH is an accessible and easily reachable country. 
 In a short time and with limited expenses, bearable even to individual citizens, it 
was possible to reach it from every part of Europe, even during the war. 
 An action area was then open 'round the corner', making the direct presence of a 
higher number of foreign actors possible (public but mainly private), unlike in the past 
when the distance from the crisis areas (and the absolute impossibility to get there) 
brought a physiological selection effect on the subjects working on-site, limiting their 
presence to the ones professionally dedicated to this kind of action. 
 With limited financial resources, many new organisations – a number tens of times 
higher than the one of the organisations that operated in recent African or Asian crises – 
not necessarily qualified for humanitarian assistance, have decided to move from a 
merely political and declarative level, and plunge themselves into the practical man-
aging of the operations which in the past were delegated to big organisations recognised 
in this field. 
 The most direct consequence of these new possibilities of non-mediated action, to-
gether with the relatively easy accessibility of the context and the lack of close moni-
toring by the international subjects on the inward and the outward courses of the con-
sidered country, is the exponential increase of foreign actors operating in it, who in a 
very short time have reached several hundreds in number. 
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 A developed country 
 BiH entered the crisis as a developed country. 
 In the years preceding the war, like most parts of SFR Yugoslavia, BiH could boast 
of high social and economic standards, more similar to the Western countries than to 
the ones of the Warsaw Pact, with which BiH is nevertheless in the Western public 
opinion often associated and homologated because of its Communist single-party re-
gime. 
 The present social system and the good educational system, have left a legacy of a 
big portion of the population, and mainly residing in urban areas, with high know-how 
levels, expectations on social work and technical and Civil Service abilities of conse-
quence, which can even be employed to take care of micro and small private enterpre-
neurial activities. 
 The former Yugoslav political class that used to see its way in the ideology of self-
management and to reproduce within the 'federal' constitutional and party order the 
pluralism of the political game controlled from above by the regime, had developed a 
self-perception as a sophisticated and complex body as far as the dynamics of ruling it 
are concerned. 
 The crisis will produce a wide range of implications, precisely because it involves a 
social and political system that was already structured before the beginning of the war. 
The aforesaid implications will actually be far and wide from the ones that could be as-
sumed by a strained depiction of a completely barren land, a stereotype fostered by 
Western journalism, which has lately been proved largely incorrect.1 
 Actually, in BiH some sectors of the advanced pre-war system managed to resist the 
strong impact of the war, and influenced by the emergency, they developed the anti-
bodies that have strengthened them and made them grow much bigger than they would 
in similar Western realities. 
 As a consequence, the biggest part of aid 'kits', deeply rooted in the Third World-
like scenarios where the problem was how 'to start from scratch' and to set development 
processes going in a certain country, have turned out to be inadequate in Bosnia when 
transferred tout court. 
 
 A rapidly changing country 
 An aspect partly linked to the preceding one is that BiH is a very fast changing sce-
nario, where the range of needs during the war years was subject to weekly changes, in 
need of constant updating, not always easy to realise with the tools available to the 
subjects organising the intervention. 
 If compared to the severe – but in a sense reassuring for the people operating in 
them – African and Asian contexts where the crises, almost always concerning devel-
 
 1 Cf. Rieff, D. 'Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the Failure of the West', New York (1995). 
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opment, were crystalized in their main features (inveterate, but precisely for this reason 
'stable' in their gravity), BiH introduces a kind of a break which demands, more than the 
quantity of the aid, the flexibility of the organization and of the administrative pro-
cedures in charge of the management and reveals the inability of the models and the 
kinds of interventions to adapt themselves to the new situations in which they're called 
to operate. 
 Delay, bureaucratic slackness, dissipating the aid and overlapping processes of par-
allel initiatives will be emphasized by this aspect. 
 
 A double transition and a political laboratory 
 As the first case of institutional and political rupture resulting in a war in a Euro-
pean state and following the disintegration of the international bipolar system, the 
conflict in BiH becomes the first chance to test the difficult course of Euro-American 
agreement on the new international dynamics: virtually a political laboratory. 
 Hence an increasing interest of the community of states for an aid-receiving country, 
so that absolutely for the first time in the peacekeeping operations the interest of donors 
– here lies the exceptionality – is equivalent if not higher than the interest of the 
recipient country. After an initial difficulty in judging the significance of a crisis whose 
losses among the civil population were underestimated, in the medium-term, however, 
the war in the former Yugoslavia assumed considerable visibility and prominence. 
 
A strategic scenario: between effectiveness and efficiency of the 
humanitarian intervention 
 BiH's peculiarity is also due to the fact that it is squeezed between two transitions 
that intersect as a spiral and for the first time at the same time concern the same area of 
East Europe. Besides the shift 'war    peace', BiH experiences the difficult and in-
complete post-Communist transition from the one-party system to a democratic and 
liberal democracy. 
 Most humanitarian projects poured into BiH would instead be catalyzed by the 
military emergency only, underestimating the breadth of the second transition – more 
sneaky, but topical – so as to influence the same war events. 
 This will prevent many foreign subjects from thoroughly understanding the political 
significance of the war. 
 Unlike the territories where suffering is linked to natural catastrophes or develop-
mental problems, the Bosnian scenario is characterised by a conflict that in every deci-
sion seems to be connected to an extremely clear and rational political clash, in spite of 
the fact that the bloody death scenarios going on during the whole war would long di-
vert people from this analysis, giving to many the feeling of the exact contrary. 
 
Pellicciari, I., Unaware Actors: Policies and..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXV, (1998), No. 5, pp. 125—135 129 
                                                                                                                                              
 Hence a journalistic information (the academic inquiry into these aspects has been 
widely lacking), more inclined to linger on 'how' instead of 'why' of the conflict, will be 
late in interpreting the fights in the former Yugoslavia as a political confrontation be-
tween the ruling groups, seeking new room for their own survival, but not hesitating to 
give new strength to the national ruptures which SFR Yugoslavia had undoubtedly 
known before. 
 Following this interpretation, that sees ethnic hatred more as a consequence than a 
cause in war strategy, we may understand how in the Balkans during these years it has 
been impossible to disregard the political meaning that every activity coming from 
abroad, even the smallest, had, in one sense or another, regarding the rupture produced 
by the option 'one-nation' or 'multi-nation'. Instead of declaring itself 'impartial' and in 
favour of 'peace' (terms which imply many twists of the meaning and ambiguities) hu-
manitarian aid has practically been forced to side with or against national separatism or 
the multi-nation reintegration in one state. 
 Therefore, each project or initiative carried out in the former Yugoslavia, will be 
subject to this evaluation, resulting in an exposure to great risks of being politically ex-
ploited by the local context. Most active actors in humanitarian aid campaign con-
fronted with this problem and – even though proclamations of fairness were common, 
as if humanitarian field itself would warrant a super-parties position – foreign actors, 
and in particular non-governmental ones, will repeatedly come off as losers in the re-
lationship with the local political élites. 
 The Bosnian context will reveal more clearly that humanitarian aid, even if carried 
out in a technically correct way (thus efficiently), doesn't necessarily grant 'correct' po-
litical relapses (thus being effective) in a scenario where everything gains a political 
undertone. Efficient aid, in other words, can result in the paradox of strengthening and 
stimulating the elements that keep wars alive. 
 
 Involved actors 
 As already seen in the past scenarios, this anomalous framework will alternatively 
see aid initiatives organised by subjects, either international/intergovernmental, or na-
tional governmental and non-governmental, in their turn linked to local, institutional or 
associations referees. The consequences of the interventions and the numerous types of 
actors appearing in each of these levels will have been changed. 
 
 The international and intergovernmental side 
 Called to operate in a sophisticated context, many of the international/intergovern-
mental agencies were asked to meet the humanitarian intervention demand emerged in 
recent years, found their political role strengthened in BiH through a process they found 
unexpected and which caused them certain embarrassment. 
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 Without any clear guidance from the national diplomacies and, consequently, even 
from the international community bodies, the agencies become the repository of the 
political 'sense' to be attributed to every single aid intervention. 
 Crushed, on the one hand, by the inability to achieve a greater flexibility in the 
programmes and in administrative managing, necessary in a context in which the food 
programmes soon will no longer be sufficient and on the other hand, by exceeding 
structures in on-site organisations which see their costs grow excessively, international 
missions in the first years of the conflict found it hard to achieve efficiency and effec-
tiveness in providing aid and registered many examples of political dispersion and ex-
ploitation of various initiatives. 
 Nor has the co-ordination/control on the myriad of associations and non-govern-
mental bodies crowding the Bosnian area fared any better: for many of them going to 
the site of crises and working in them becomes possible even without a link or authori-
zation by one of the international missions present there. In response to the growth of 
political discernment of the UN officers working on-site (firstly form UNHCR2, an oc-
currence that will generate quite a few disputes within the United Nations themselves) 
the remaining institutional levels in their turn, in a framework of 'co-ordinators' without 
'co-ordinated subjects' will generate a series of permanent missions which theoretically 
have different tasks, but in practice often experience overlapping activities. This will be 
aggravated by the inability of the agencies to modify their methods of intervention and 
management of the projects vis-ŕ-vis the new needs, first of all the inability of providing 
themselves with the tools to pile up an institutional and political memory regarding the 
area in which they are operating. Certain that the scenario is highly political, a fast 
turnover in personnel imposed by the agencies operating in BiH has soon generated a 
situation in which the work experience accrued becomes difficult to transfer to the 
successor of a person leaving the job. 
¸ 
 The governmental side 
 In the Balkan's 'merry-go-round', the diplomacy of different states, Western and 
Arab as well, showed to be willing to take initiatives not always corresponding to the 
international community strategies, in which some of them take part at the multilateral 
level anyway. 
 With time, the more the effects of the war were becoming devastating, the more the 
diplomatic initiative would demand, in order to be effective, a strong involvement on 
emergency projects of the co-operation governmental agencies of individual states. 
They became then a complementary tool of the diplomatic policies so much as to turn in 
the mid-years of the conflict into the sole real vector of the bilateral relations between 
the Bosnian scenario and European states, leaving behind the traditional diplomatic 
 
 2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 Cf. Cunliffe S.A. e Pugh M.: 'The Politicization of UNHCR in the Former Yugoslavia' in Journal of 
Refugees Studies, X (2), Oxford, June 1997; Pugh M.: 'Humanitarianism and Peacekeeping' in Global Society 
10 (3), pp. 205-24 
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channels of career, an aspect that will bring about new psychological ambiguities within 
the administrations of individual states. 
 It should also be noted that in a similar grouping of states, the co-operation agencies 
act as self-relying 'microcosms', drawing their strength from being legitimated by the 
government of their countries of origin and they make the horizontal (between similar 
co-operation offices of different states) and the vertical co-ordination (with the 
international agencies and the myriad of associations and non-governmental interven-
tions, within or outside their operating range) even more difficult. 
 At the same time, in many cases the state agencies will persist in the old and con-
solidated model of relationship with a restricted number of NGOs from their respective 
countries, which de facto cuts off the growing number of new subjects starting to oper-
ate in the area. 
 This activism sought by the single state co-operations and often protected from out-
side interference is sometimes a symptom (see for instance the complex relationship 
between USAID3 and the rest of European countries’ co-operations) of the difference in 
the political approach of the various states, but it’s also sometimes a manifest choice of 
isolationism, as it happens with many interventions coming from the Arab countries that 
mostly consider it essential to start up co-operation in Bosnian territories (especially in 
the areas with a majority Muslim population) without communicating to the third 
parties the features and the progress of their projects. 
 In general, for all of them the co-ordination level, whenever there is one, doesn't go 
further than the simple information released to the other actors operating in the area 
involved in the emergency or reconstruction intervention, which cannot in any case be 
blocked or modified through the decision of a different country from the one organising 
the aid. 
 The 'donation' is still a ruling value that puts the project in an extraterritorial area, 
makes it an untouchable activity and leaves to the receivers the freedom to define the 
objectives and the characteristics of intervention, as well as the choice of the local 
partners and the stages of implementation. 
 The foreign non-governmental side 
 The element that makes the crisis of the aid system in BiH more clear is the number 
of bodies that have been operating there during these years, so high as to make im-
possible – with the present instruments – any reliable survey.4 The non-governmental 
actors that poured in great numbers into BiH were the ones to make their total number 
grow out of proportion. This multiplying effect is due to the high number of European 
and extra-European countries which go to BiH, but also to the many new kinds of 'non-
 
 3 United States Agency for International Development, U.S. co-operation state-Agency 
 4 The difficulty in determining all the operating subjects may be guessed from what is by now the most 
thorough mapping of the subjects operating in the humanitarian field and in development in BiH: see 
I.C.V.A.: 'Directory of Humanitarian and Development Agencies operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina', 
Sarajevo, 1998 
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governmental entities' that have now appeared and want to operate personally. It's 
mainly due to them that, in the first part of the conflict, (1992-1994) traditional NGOs, 
engaged in managing co-operation projects in the African and Asian fields, almost kept 
aloof, uncertain about how to react vis-ŕ-vis the new emergency requests coming from 
BiH. 
 To the traditional and sometimes exclusive dual relationship state-agencies/NGOs, a 
long series of associations and volunteer groups can be added, sometimes even political 
and/or denominational organizations that wish to work in BiH and to create – almost 
always autonomously – on-site aids and projects, self-financed with collection 
campaigns started up in their countries of origin. 
 Some of these new organizations are created on purpose (as an 'Aid Committee'), 
while others are pre-existing organizations, very different, that are not devoted to hu-
manitarian intervention, but who decide during the crisis to implement directly those 
projects for which funds have been collected, without transferring them, as it used to be 
done in the past, to more organized bodies or bodies specifically engaged in this field. 
 The above-mentioned great visibility offered by BiH, together with moral choices, 
makes it possible for the numerous organizations involved at this level, in terms of le-
gitimation/protagonism, to be used as a resource in their countries of origin. Being pre-
sent in Bosnia is considered an element of prestige and of organization reliability, 
which will make co-ordinating their activities even more difficult. The risk of overlap-
ping – previously foreseen – now becomes uncontrollable. 
 The issue of efficiency for many of these subjects represents an insurmountable bar-
rier, even more than the problem of effectiveness. 
 Having matured through the experience in the sole field of quantitative political 
mobilization in their countries of origin on the occasion of different crises (like 'or-
ganization of pacifist sit-ins') these subjects find great difficulties in suddenly switching 
to a dimension of qualitative and technical action as well, demanded by the new areas 
of intervention (like 'managing a refugee camp in Bosnia and chosing the aid to be 
provided'). 
 The 'goodness' of the subjects and of the message they bear is not enough to guar-
antee their efficiency anymore, so that the range of the 'good-and-incapable' operators 
widens. 
 This will show the problem of control of these interventions, betraying their limita-
tions during their implementation and afterwards. 
 The complete autonomy of these actions, together with the will to avoid frustrating 
common emotionality and people's true involvement, that is the base of many aid col-
lection campaigns in the countries of the origin of the associations, will make the criti-
cism about the realization of the 'do-it-yourself' projects almost impossible and very 
rare anyway, even in case of a clear failure. 
 During the conflict years then, for want of any kind of authority in the countries of 
origin as well as in BiH, to exert control on the aid/solidarity projects, an evaluation 
will only be the concern of the Western public opinion that, devoid of information and 
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evaluation elements, will again let themselves think more about the 'goodness' of the 
initiatives than about their real impact. 
 
 Local referees and beneficiaries: institutions and associations 
 Beneficiaries and local institutional referees are an essential part of the aid organi-
zation whose assent is often the only requirement to operate on site, so that for many 
non-governmental foreign subjects in search of finances, their identification has been 
one among the few necessary steps between the conception and the realisation of the 
projects. 
 As far as local institutional referees are concerned, the Bosnian political class 
mainly converged in local authorities is becoming stronger, a class that – rooted in the 
territory and relatively autonomous from the centre – doesn't hesitate to use aid initia-
tives for political purposes, after granting a bureaucratic permission rarely denied 
through informal procedures (like 'Mayor's declaration of intents', 'general letter of 
support', etc.). 
 The scheme of the aid initiative, legitimated 'because it is requested by the Bosni-
ans', soon becomes the common inflated trait of the various fund-raising strategies, so 
that it happens that the same Bosnian institution 'sustains' different interventions, some 
of which are in obvious opposition. 
 Apart from the programmes for the refugees’ repatriation (that concern one of the 
most controversial issues of the war and for this reason are object of difficult negotia-
tions) the Bosnian side seldom says no to the rest of the activities and donations coming 
from abroad. 
 On the other hand, the aid organizers' search for active local referees to be included 
in the project implementation process will have to deal with two aspects. Firstly, the 
concentration of numerous projects on the few referees, who – overloaded and yet un-
able to renounce them – accept to be local active partners for a number of disconnected 
projects coming from different countries that don't communicate upstream, with effi-
ciency limits easy to guess. Secondly, we witness the mushrooming of Bosnian NGOs. 
While in the Afro-Asian context the role of international bodies was to favour civil so-
ciety development through the promotion of the creation of local independent associa-
tions, in case of Bosnia – a developed country – the problem is the beginning of a selec-
tion among the tens of associations and non-governmental Bosnian bodies, partly in-
herited from the self-managing system and partly born during and after the war, espe-
cially in the BiH Federation, where the largest portion of the flow of humanitarian in-
terventions can be found. 
 The trend among the local subjects is that, once a range of possible activities is de-
termined, the main worry becomes the creation of ad hoc structures rather than the co-
ordination with the existing ones. Also, clear examples of cross-cutting membership can 
be noted: the same restricted group of people participates actively at the local in-
stitutional level as well as in the associations, that are supposed to be their critical, non-
governmental interlocutor. 
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 Local NGOs, whose life is strictly linked to the approved projects for which funds 
have been allocated, become a privileged occupation in a country with extremely high 
unemployment levels and very low wage levels. 
 These organizations, born to operate from the inside to make the peace process 
easier, represent a real acceleration factor only in the beginning. Later on, experiencing 
a transposition process and worried about the survival of their structure, they see the 
progressive normalization of the framework as a risk of being abolished. 
 
 Conclusion: After Dayton 
 Now, three years after the Dayton Peace Accords, we can say that the war left the 
legacy of some malfunctions of the preceding years, even though we should underline 
considerable improvements in the political co-ordination of the diplomatic initiatives, 
an obvious result of the international political guidance that was much clearer than in 
the past. 
 The creation of OHR5 joint diplomatic mission that is still trying to reconcile the 
different European and American approaches, was actually successful in limiting the 
excessive activity of the single states and the spreading of disconnected diplomatic ini-
tiatives, that nevertheless are again the main protagonists in the political arena as re-
gards governmental co-operation in the agencies’ activities. 
 The shift, still going on and not completed yet, from an emergency stage to the re-
construction, changed many of the subjects operating on-site, that still remain numerous 
and difficult to set in an overall rational framework. 
 The idea of the co-ordination between the different projects and interventions still 
remains an unfulfilled plan and BiH on many occasions seems like a country that has to 
face the dimension of the 'forced aid' that generates an economy depending and feeding 
itself solely on the resources brought in by humanitarian as well as reconstruc-
tion\development projects. 
 Sarajevo has become the portrait of this 'after-war' and 'before the peace' stage. 
Coming out of a very tough three-year siege that had made it the emblem of the war, 
Sarajevo became the symbolic destination of all the subjects who could not get there 
during the war due to obvious practical difficulties and that are now setting up their 
headquarters in BiH. 
 Besides, we have been witnessing a Bosnian process of strong political and admin-
istrative centralisation on Sarajevo, that is a reaction to the phenomenon – unnecessary 
– of the increased municipal local authorities’ competences witnessed during the war. 
 
 5 Office of the High Representative, executive instrument of the Peace Implementation Council. The 
Conference of Bonn of 9-10 December 1997 considerably widened its power, making it the main interlocutor 
of Bosnian institutions for all the democratic consolidation processes. 
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This makes an equal distribution of the aid between the centre and the peripheries quite 
impossible, and Sarajevo soon becomes – with its more than 12.000 international 
operators – the clearest image of a system 'overloaded' with aid intervention and per-
sonnel working there. Nevertheless, the myth of reconstruction overturns any other 
criticism on the international presence in BiH, in spite of the impression that, what with 
the war over, this is not simply a territory to be rebuilt, as promoted by the stereotypes 
that attract Western entrepreneurs who express their will to contribute in this stage. 
 With the wounds and the local political class that, at a close look, came out of the 
conflict quite invigorated, the issue of political mediation on reconstruction becomes 
central. 
 Foreign bodies do not always wish to invest into this, which is fundamental for set-
ting the confidence building processes going. Today, trying to reconstruct a wall makes 
no sense if we don't previously create a solid political and social consensus so that that 
same wall will not be pulled down again in a few months or years. 
 
Translated by the author 
